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BEFORE THE ENVIRONMENTAL APPEALS BOARD U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION JAGENCY 4:09 WASHINGTON, D.C. ENVIR. APPEALS BOALD

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ORDER SETTING ORAL ARGUMENT

IN THE MATTER OF:

BAYER CROPSCIENCE LP, and : FIFRA Appeal No. NICHINO AMERICA, INC. : 16-01

Docket No. FIFRA-HO-2016-0001:

Wednesday, June 22, 2016

Administrative Courtroom Room 1152 EPA East Building 1201 Constitution Avenue, NW Washington, DC

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing, pursuant to notice, at 1:00 p.m.

BEFORE:

THE HONORABLE KATHIE A. STEIN Environmental Appeals Judge

THE HONORABLE MARY KAY LYNCH Environmental Appeals Judge

THE HONORABLE MARY BETH WARD Environmental Appeals Judge

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ALSO PRESENT:

ANNETTE DUNCAN

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1:00 p.m.

MS. DUNCAN: The Environmental Appeals
Board of the United States Environmental
Protection Agency is now in session for oral
argument in re: Bayer CropScience, LP, Nichino
America, Inc., docket number FIFRA-HQ-2016-0001,
FIFRA appeal number 1601. The Honorable Judges
Mary Beth Ward, Kathie Stein, Mary Kay Lynch
presiding. Please turn off all cell phones, and
no recording device allowed. Please be seated.

JUDGE STEIN: Good morning, everyone. Thank you for coming today and appearing for this oral argument which was obviously scheduled on relatively short notice after the EPA filed its brief, but we are aware of the importance of this proceeding, and the importance of proceeding relatively expeditiously, at the same time giving due consideration to the importance and complexity of the issues in this case.

Could we please have the parties state their appearances and who is with them today

starting with Bayer?

MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: Good afternoon to the entire board. My name is Kathy Szmuszkovicz and I represent Bayer CropScience in this matter. With me today in the courtroom is the division counsel from Bayer, Kristina Kring, the vice president of environmental safety for Bayer, Dr. Peter Coody, the head of federal registrations for Bayer, Charlotte Sanson, and the individual responsible for flubendiamide registration, Nancy Delaney.

From Nichino, we have the vice president of regulatory, Dr. Lydia Cox right behind me and her outside counsel, Mr. Ken Morris. With me from Beveridge and Diamond are my colleagues David Barker, Daniel Eisenberg, and Robert Dewey.

JUDGE STEIN: Thank you, and would you like to reserve five minutes for rebuttal?

MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: We would, and if I may also just introduce the assistant general counsel here Kirstin Landis and her outside

counsel, Warren Lehrenbaum is here as well. 1 JUDGE STEIN: Okay, thank you all for 2 3 joining us today. EPA? 4 MS. GOERKE: Good afternoon, my name 5 is Ariadne Goerke, and with me are Bob Perlis 6 from EPA, and Scott Garrison from EPA. 7 JUDGE STEIN: Thank you. We will 8 proceed with Bayer first. 9 MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: Thank you again, 10 Your Honors, and may it please the board, the 11 registrants appreciate your providing opportunity for the parties to appear before you 12 13 to address the questions that you may have as you 14 deliberate on the final EPA decision in this 15 matter. 16 We also especially appreciate 17 statutory schedule places an unusual burden on 18 the EAB to make its final determination in a very 19 short period of weeks, and we thank you and those 20 who are working with you for your work to 21 complete this undertaking in a thoughtful way. 22 Today, the registrants wish first and

foremost to address your questions. To the extent there's time, we do have remarks prepared on several issues of first impression presented by this case. And finally, as Judge Stein invited, we would like to reserve five minutes for rebuttal.

JUDGE STEIN: Well, let me begin then with questions because we have several. Reading through the briefs and the administrative law judge's decision, it appears that the lawfulness of the condition in question is at the heart of this appeal.

Under 6(e)(2), the statute prescribes the scope of this hearing. What authority does the board have in light of that statute to consider whether the condition is lawful or not?

MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: We're pleased that you see the heart of the issue as being whether the registrants are entitled to a 6(b) hearing. The statutory authority is clear that when EPA has rendered a decision based on unreasonable adverse effects on the environment, a section

1 6(b) hearing should ensue. That was made clear 2 in the Reckitt Benckiser case. 3 JUDGE STEIN: Right, no, I understand 4 your argument about 6(b), but directing your 5 attention specifically to 6(e) which provides 6 that the only matters for resolution at that 7 hearing shall be whether the registrant has 8 initiated and pursued appropriate action to 9 comply with a condition or conditions within the 10 time period provided, or whether the conditions 11 have been satisfied within the time period 12 provided, whether the administrator's and 13 determination with respect to the disposition of existing stocks is consistent with that chapter. 14 15 MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: Right. 16 JUDGE STEIN: As I understand it, this 17 proceeding has been brought under 6(e). understand you're challenging that, but under the 18 19 terms of 6(e), what authority does the board have to even consider whether the condition is lawful? 20 21 MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: Well, the -22 JUDGE STEIN: I mean, it strikes me

that that is beyond the statute, so I'd like to hear your response to that question.

MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: Well, to begin with, as we understand it, the board is looking at this issue de novo. There has been no EPA final decision as to the cancellation, as to the decision on whether 6(e) or 6(b) is proper until this tribunal makes that decision.

And we would say that EPA's bringing of the matter to the ALJ under 6(e) was a contrivance, that all of the conditions of registration that were lawful had been met, that the only so-called condition of registration that EPA is alleging was not met, never was properly put in place, and never was properly triggered, and that really it is the job of the EAB to look at the agency's behavior, decisions, actions, whether it met its obligations under the statute at this point fresh, and determine whether or not this case is properly before you under 6(e).

JUDGE STEIN: Right, but there's nothing in 6(e) that you could point me to that

1	would give us authority to look at the lawfulness
2	of the condition, is that correct?
3	MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: Nothing within
4	6(e), but 6(e) is a contrivance in this
5	situation. One needs to really stand back as the
6	voice of the agency to say is it lawful for OPP
7	to insist on waivers of rights that are unlawful
8	in order to avoid its statutory obligations under
9	the statute?
10	And you would not be the first
11	tribunal to admonish OPP on this. Two recent
12	tribunals have done so, and it's a repeated
13	issue, very important to be addressed and
14	stopped.
15	JUDGE STEIN: Doesn't the registration
16	itself on its face speak to the question that
17	suspension would be under 6(e)?
18	MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: It's interesting
19	that you use that terminology "suspension"
20	because throughout this proceeding -
21	JUDGE STEIN: I meant cancellation.
22	Let me correct myself.

MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: And perhaps we'll have an opportunity to talk about suspension under 6(e) because it's very important that EPA continues to say it needed the provision that you're referring to, but it has the authority under 6(c) to suspend a product whenever it determines that there's a need to do so quickly.

JUDGE STEIN: Right, I was just directing your attention to page two of the cover letter on what is labeled "PBNX-07" -

MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: Yes.

JUDGE STEIN: which says, "Your release for shipment these of products constitutes acceptance of the conditions of registration as outlined in the preliminary acceptance letter for flubendiamide dated July 30, 2008. If these conditions are not complied with, the registration will be subject to cancellation in accordance with Section 6(e) of FIFRA." Isn't that something that the company has been aware of since the time that it - since 2008?

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1 MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: Yes, absolutely. 2 and all of the parties to this matter have 3 acknowledged that the acceptance letter that you 4 referred to was unconventional and unique. It 5 was the provision regarding voluntary 6 cancellation that the applicants found 7 objectionable. They tried to remove it from the 8 letter. EPA refused. 9 There was no choice other than to sign 10 the letter and accept these conditions, but the 11 registrants did so with the understanding that 12 there would be good faith scientific discussions 13 and exchange, which did not take place, and also 14 with a fervent commitment that if the science 15 dictated, the products would be cancelled, and the science did not dictate that. 16 17 JUDGE LYNCH: Can I - the notice 18 itself includes the language same about 19 cancellation proceedings will be conducted under 20 6(e), correct? 21 MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: It does. 22 JUDGE LYNCH: And then let me ask you,

if - I understand your arguments, but if a
cancellation proceeding was properly brought in a
case under 6(e), could the legality of the
conditions be challenged?
MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: We do believe so
because the issue of whether a fundamental -
whether the condition itself is legal is a
necessary predicate to determining whether there
was any requirement to fulfill the condition.
All of the legal conditions were fulfilled, the
data requirements.
JUDGE LYNCH: I'm not talking about
your case. I'm just talking about -
MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: In general?
JUDGE LYNCH: - in general. So you're
saying that in any 6(e) proceeding, if a party
wanted to challenge the legality of a condition,
they could do so, and -
MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: I don't think this
tribunal needs to go that far and -
JUDGE LYNCH: Well, let me ask - so
can you answer the question?

1	MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: Yeah, and I would
2	not say so. I would not say so. I would say
3	this case presents a unique set of facts, and the
4	tribunal need only reach a conclusion based on
5	the record here.
6	JUDGE LYNCH: In terms of the legality
7	of the condition in this case, is it your
8	position that the condition was illegal in 2008?
9	MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: Yes, and I think
10	there was a recognition that it was very unusual
11	and the registrations would not be granted
12	without it, but the registrants went into the
13	proceeding anticipating, as they had experienced
14	in other matters, that there would be a good
15	faith discussion of the data and the conclusions,
16	which did not occur here.
17	JUDGE LYNCH: But you're saying it was
18	not unusual, but you're saying that it was
19	illegal in 2008?
20	MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: Yes, because -
21	JUDGE LYNCH: In 2009?
22	MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: And it was - yes,

1 it was a -JUDGE LYNCH: And '10? 2 3 MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: And '10 - a contrivance to help EPA try to protect itself 4 5 from having to go through the process that it's 6 obligated to do and that courts have told it it 7 is obligated to do under section 6(b) when it 8 makes unreasonable adverse an 9 determination. JUDGE LYNCH: And are you - were you 10 11 barred from going to court or any - taking any 12 other action to challenge the legality then? 13 MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: The question of 14 judicial efficiency and - is an important one 15 here because there should be -16 JUDGE LYNCH: That wasn't my question, 17 but -18 MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: Yes, but there 19 should be, there should be - I think that the 20 registrants recognize that to go into court and use the resources of the courts and EPA when in 21 22 the end, had there been a good faith discussion

and an actual meritorious decision based on 1 2 unreasonable adverse effects, it would have been 3 unnecessary, would be a poor use of everyone's 4 resources. 5 JUDGE LYNCH: But you could have gone 6 into court? 7 Well, I'm not MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: 8 opining on whether a court would have viewed us 9 as reaching the jurisdictional bar to get into 10 We could have tried, but I'm not sure 11 that that would have succeeded. 12 JUDGE WARD: But counsel, you also had the option of turning down the conditional 13 14 registration with these conditions which would 15 have prompted a 6(b) hearing at that time, 16 correct? 17 MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: That's a false 18 option with all respect to everyone who has 19 suggested it because at the point of this 20 decision, we had before us a very remarkable 21 product after \$125 million of investment, and 22 demonstrated to EPA that it had a worker safety

profile that it was very safe, remarkably safe across the board to humans, mammals, birds, fish.

The only issue is the issue of impacts on benthic invertebrate aquatic organisms. Ironically, today the agency at the very same entrance that we came in, will be greeted by members of the public who are saying that the agency is not taking enough action to protect beneficial insects.

This is an insecticide the EPA has said is practically nontoxic to bees, pollinators, and other beneficial insects. So to suggest that there really was an option, either from EPA's perspective or ours, of turning down this product in the face of that remarkable profile, is not practically - is not a practical solution.

JUDGE WARD: It was a choice.

MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: It wasn't a real choice. It wasn't a real choice. There is no registrant who has ever made that choice, and there is not a registrant that would make that

1	choice.
2	JUDGE WARD: Is there anything in the
3	record demonstrating that you objected at that
4	time that the condition was illegal?
5	MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: The discussions
6	that went back and forth were between non-
7	lawyers, and there were plenty of objections to
8	the provision. There was a length negotiation,
9	and the final agreement was predicated on the
10	fact that there would be a measured scientific
11	dialogue, which did not take place here.
12	JUDGE WARD: But you didn't object
13	that it was illegal at the time?
14	MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: No, there was not
15	an - I'm not aware that there were lawyers
16	involved at the time.
17	JUDGE LYNCH: I mean, it was - you
18	mentioned the amount of money you spent. Is
19	there a dollar cut off?
20	MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: No, that was just
21	to suggest that there had been a substantial
22	investment in a product that has a remarkable

safety profile, and it really would have been a disservice to the public to deprive it of that tool.

The other factor that's been lost in the maelstrom is that this product is used for a huge array of minor use crops, so minor crops that can't often afford having the support of a registration.

The federal agency that is tasked with helping to facilitate these IR-4 has been very involved in the expansion of the product, and in fact, complained to EPA that they were completely cut out of the discussions on cancellation, existing stocks, and Judge Biro took no note of that whatsoever.

It's remarkable to have a federal agency commenting in this kind of setting. It's remarkable to see the array of grower groups across the country, the organization that represents all retailers and distributors saying, "Something is wrong here, and we're depending on the EAB as the final word of EPA to correct what

has been done so far."

JUDGE STEIN: Before we turn to the you have raised a number of questions about the
good faith dialogue, and we'll get there in just
a moment.

MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: Thank you.

JUDGE STEIN: But I wanted to go back to the options. I mean, I think a couple of options have been identified. You say these were false choices, one of which was to attempt to appeal to federal court, accept the registration and attempt to appeal to federal court. The other of which is to tell the EPA you wouldn't accept the registration on those terms. Were there any additional options available to you?

MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: We don't think so.

It's been suggested that the parties could have taken the registration and then - to amend it, but that's exactly what happened in the Woodstream case. The party made a timely request for amendment. EPA did not act on it. Even after the matter went into federal court, EPA

failed to ever act on the amendment request, and the reason was because it would have triggered the 6(b) hearing. There's a pattern here.

JUDGE STEIN: Well, you can't assume that that's how EPA would have treated this request, can you? I mean, I assume that's just speculation on your part?

MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: Well, I don't think there's any reason to - there's never been an instance where EPA has acted on such an amendment. And when you look at the pattern of behavior by the Office of Pesticide Programs, whether it's in Reckitt Benckiser, whether it's in the sulfoxaflor case, whether it's in the Woodstream case, every single action is to avoid section 6(b) hearings.

Because EPA does not want us, despite
all of the rhetoric about transparency, it does
not want to subject its science to real peer
review, to interagency input, to input from the
growers and other stakeholders, and to go before
the scientific advisory panel, to go before the

1 National Academy of Sciences and defend their 2 science. 3 "Too risky," is what EPA said in a 4 letter recently that's part of the - that's one 5 of the documents in evidence, and too much effort. 6 7 JUDGE STEIN: Okay, so as I understand 8 the sequence of events, what EPA proposed 9 initially was a firm date for the end of this registration. 10 11 Right. MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: 12 JUDGE STEIN: And my understanding, 13 and correct me if I'm wrong, is that the 14 documents in the record reflect that that was a 15 condition that your clients did not want to 16 accept, and therefore proposed an alternative. 17 Is that a correct or incorrect understanding of the record? 18 19 MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: They did not want 20 to accept it and they deleted it. EPA proposed 21 this alternative. Our -22 JUDGE STEIN: In response to your

deletion of the firm date? 1 MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: Deletion. And it's 2 3 interesting -JUDGE STEIN: So another option would 4 5 have been to simply accept the firm date as EPA 6 proposed? 7 MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: I suppose someone 8 could have accepted that. These companies 9 decided not to, and that's to a temporal issue that's really, I think, critical also. EPA gave 10 11 a period of years in that first registration, and 12 then extended it, and extended it, and extended it again. 13 14 And as of this summer, EPA proposed, 15 EPA proposed, and Judge Biro was inaccurate in 16 her statement on this, that the registrations be 17 extended another three years while the companies responded to EPA's request for additional data 18 19 and analysis. The suggestion that EPA, "needed" 20 this immediate cancellation at the point that it 21 decided it wanted, it just doesn't hold up under 22 the facts here.

JUDGE STEIN: Doesn't the statute specify conditions under which conditional registrations can be granted? I mean, aren't there - I mean, I'm assuming that EPA's not free just to say, you know, to grant a conditional registration for an unlimited period of time. MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: Well, the statute that's also an important point and it

that's also an important point and it distinguishes our case from some of the ways that other registrants have argued it. We do think that EPA has fairly broad discretion to impose conditions beyond conditions requiring data, which is explicitly mentioned in the statute. But we think in this case, it went too far.

We're not asking you to draw what the bright line is, but we do acknowledge that it goes beyond asking for data, which is specifically mentioned in the statute. It just doesn't go to asking people to waive rights to something they don't even know how it's going to transpire in the future.

JUDGE LYNCH: Well, related to the

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2 the legality of the conditions, if you can challenge the legality of the conditions, can a 3 4 third party challenge the legality? 5 MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: That gets into a really complicated jurisdictional question under 6 7 the statute. I think that a person could 8 petition EPA concerning an agency action, and 9 based on a decision, and if they have the - and 10 if the agency renders a decision on that that's a 11 final agency action, that could potentially be 12 I think there's a first amendment appealed. 13 right to raise issues. The statute itself is 14 quite limited in who can bring which type of actions at what time. 15 JUDGE LYNCH: And if the condition or 16 17 a condition was determined to be illegal, what's your view of what that means for the registration 18 for the conditional -19 20 MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: Really, and it's 21 such a good, another really good question. 22 this case, it would mean you simply delete that

conditions and your view that you can challenge

condition. 1 The rest of the registration is 2 lawful. The rest of the conditions were 3 obviously met, and EPA had no need, because it 4 had the statutory authority, to suspend the 5 product if it needed to, to have this provision. 6 So this particular legal provision 7 could be excised without any effect on the 8 remainder of the registration. It's an unusual 9 situation because EPA was asking for something it 10 already had the legal authority to do under the 11 statute. 12 JUDGE LYNCH: So counsel, could I 13 follow up? Is it your position that EPA could or 14 could not include a time limitation in the 15 registration? Going back to the first, I quess, 16 first condition that EPA had proposed, would that 17 have been lawful? 18 MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: It's not a question before the board, but I believe that it would be 19 20 unlawful under FIFRA. And this is an area that 21 has never been tested, but to have an automatic

date would mean

expiration

22

depriving

registrants of all of their 6(b) rights. So for the same reasons that we're talking about here, our position would be that an automatic expiration is unlawful. That's not before you, but as long as you've asked, that's our answer.

JUDGE LYNCH: But - sorry.

JUDGE WARD: I was going to say so you had 6(b) rights. You still have 6(b) rights I suppose arguably, right? You could have at that time not accepted the conditional registration. Then you would have had your opportunity for a 6(b) hearing, correct?

MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: It would not have been a 6(b) hearing. 6(b) hearings apply to products that are on the market and being sold, and where EPA has proposed to remove them. The type of hearing that we would have had in that situation, we would not have been on the market. We would have received a denial which would be a final agency action, and we'd be appealing the denial, all the while the product could not be sold.

JUDGE WARD: Okay, but I think going back to the time limitation point, reading the statute regarding conditional registrations, it talks about conditional registrations for a period of time.

MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: Right.

JUDGE WARD: And so reading that, at least the plain language would suggest that generally speaking, conditional registrations would have or would be time limited, which is a provision that you objected to in exchange for something that would give you arguably greater rights under this conditional registration, not fewer rights.

MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: Well, those two types of provisions are viewed as very different, and EPA's sole witness at the ALJ hearing, Ms. Susan Lewis, who is the head of the registration division currently, said that those types of provisions are very distinct and viewed that way, and the reason is because there's nothing automatic about cancellation.

There are - and the statute as a whole 1 needs to be read together. Section 6(b) provides 2 3 a very detailed process, which is backed up by 4 regulations, of what needs to happen before a 5 product is cancelled for failing to meet the 6 unreasonable adverse effects standard on the 7 environment. The conditional registration issue, 8 9 Benckiser briefs, it's taking a 10 11

and this is a point that EPA made in the Reckitt different position here, is that under 6(e), it's really a question about the conditions and time, the timing to those, the general of data, which is the most common condition that you have. But an automatic expiration would involve writing 6(b) out of the statute, and that would be illegal.

JUDGE STEIN: Let me turn to a slightly different area right now, and I'm going to add more time because we have a lot more questions, so.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: Okay, thank you. I see you have just a JUDGE STEIN:

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minute left, but when the buzzer rings, if we can add 15 more minutes to the clock after the clock runs out. And the good faith question that you would like to get to, and which we will get to, the ALJ ruled against petitioners on that point claiming that you had waived that objection by failing to object in the initial objections that you filed. Can you point me to where in your objections you think you sufficiently preserved that issue?

MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: And we outlined this in our briefs if you'll just give a moment to find it, if you'll give me a moment to find it. And in general, I would say that there has been replete throughout the discussions the objections in all of the briefs that we've filed our position that we did not have the good faith discussions that were envisioned back in 2008 and that we normally -

JUDGE STEIN: Well, I've looked at those objections pretty carefully, and under the objection addressing compliance with conditions,

what I see in the request for hearing at 49, paragraph 165 is, "Throughout 2015, scientists from the registrants and EPA engaged in discussions about the benefits and risks of flubendiamide." So where in that would I find Bayer's and Nichino's objection on good faith grounds.

MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: Good faith? Well, the whole discussion about what occurred in December and January - so starting with a meeting in December, on December 15, in which the assistant administrator led the meeting and the highest officials of both companies were there, the registrants were informed that that was the final meeting. Never was it discussed or explained that there was a change to the way that EPA was doing its science and -

JUDGE STEIN: Right, well, I understand factually you described and talked about the meetings, but where did Bayer and Nichino raise a legal objection to the good faith dialogue? I don't see that, and if you could

point me to where you raised a legal objection to that, that would be most helpful to the board. And if you want to provide it in your rebuttal, that would be fine.

MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: We will do so.

It's remarkable, and there's an awful lot of records available to you, but you do have a good record available to you to make that finding. Perhaps the most persuasive thing to me was having Dr. Coody explain to me the ramifications of appendix three, page 50, of a document that is one of our exhibits, Exhibit 31, where buried in one table in an addendum to a risk assessment is the only place that you find that EPA relied on a single endpoint, and that it wasn't the endpoint about sediments that concerned it, it was the endpoint about water.

Nowhere in EPA's decision document, nowhere in the notice of intent to cancel, nowhere in any document that we were provided in advance of the demand for a cancellation, and to me, that explains with a punctuation point

1 factually that there was not good faith. Did we 2 make a -3 JUDGE STEIN: Am I right though that 4 the original endpoint that was agreed upon or 5 that was originally used was 0.028? 6 MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: And EPA said that 7 is not the appropriate endpoint because it was in 8 water, pore water, rather than sediment, and 9 these sediment dwelling are invertebrates. 10 11 So the registrants generated the data 12 have the endpoint that to EPA said 13 appropriate, and EPA was relying on that from the 14 point that that endpoint became available up 15 through the summer. Then the assistant 16 administrator -17 JUDGE STEIN: Can you give me an 18 indication where in the record EPA said it wasn't 19 the appropriate endpoint? 20 MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: Yes, yes, yes. Let 21 me see if we have that in our science. And maybe 22 we should do that in the rebuttal too so as to

keep you -

JUDGE STEIN: That would be fine.

MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: - to give you the citations. We'll give you all of the citations in the rebuttal.

JUDGE WARD: And Counsel, just picking up that thread of the facts here, there was a meeting December 15 with the registrants and EPA.

There was an email - there was a communication on December 16 at which, at least reading it on its face, it appears as if at that point, the registrants understood that EPA had reverted to the original lower toxicity endpoint.

There is further, at least reading the record that we have before us, there appears there was some information provided to the registrants, and then a further meeting in January, an all day meeting. And I think we read the record as suggesting that there was a discussion of the endpoint at that meeting. Is that a fair reading of the record, and if not, why not?

MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: And there's a number of people in the room who were at that meeting. I personally was there, and I'm going to speak from personal, my personal knowledge of it.

JUDGE WARD: I think we need to stick with what's in the record.

MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: Okay, well, what's in the record, EPA discussed a suite of toxicity endpoints. At that meeting, what EPA presented was that it would be looking at a suite of endpoints. When you read Exhibit 31, PBNX Exhibit 31, you see a table of a suite of endpoints.

But not until you go to appendix three, page 50, do you see one table on a page with lots of tables that shows that the sole endpoint that was being relied upon was the water endpoint as opposed to the sediment endpoint, and we'll tie that together with the EPA's statement about why when they had the water endpoint, that was not sufficient for the inquiry that it wished

1 to undertake that sediment, they wanted something 2 specific to sediment which is where these 3 invertebrates dwell. 4 JUDGE WARD: But there was some dialogue -5 6 MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: There wasn't really 7 a dialogue. 8 JUDGE WARD: - at the meeting? 9 MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: There was 10 presentation by the EPA scientists about 11 apologizing for the unfortunate way in which the 12 discussions had arisen, and saying that they were 13 looking - assuring the registrants they were 14 looking at a suite of endpoints. 15 And then on the same day the 16 registration cancellation was demanded, buried in 17 a document that had been written the day before 18 and provided to the registrants, signed the day 19 before and provided to the registrants on January 20 29, back in appendix three, page 50, one table, 21 you find the answer to how EPA actually did the

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calculation.

1 That's not a transparent good faith. 2 You've got people coming in from across the 3 country, even as far away as Japan for Nichino's 4 parent company, to discuss the science, and 5 never, never was it explained that that one 6 endpoint would drive, let alone that the human health aspects would not be taken into account, 7 8 the effects on non-target organisms, any of these 9 other factors that really need to be done under a risk benefit balancing under FIFRA. 10 11 What the assistant administrator told

What the assistant administrator told everybody in the room on December 15 is that he would not have registered this product, and he thought he could cancel it based on persistence alone based on this one issue which was never fully - EPA's scientific position was never fully explained.

That's inconsistent with FIFRA, but his entire staff heard it, and sure enough, the next day, they apparently gave him the basis to reach that conclusion.

JUDGE STEIN: Don't the decision

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documents say that EPA looked at both endpoints
in their final decision?
MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: And that's
precisely the point. It didn't. When you look
at the calculation that drives the decision, it
was based on one endpoint. I mean -
JUDGE STEIN: And is this argument
that you're laying out to us now, is this an
argument you made to the administrative law
judge?
MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: The administrative
law judge, although she obviously reached a
conclusion about the risks and benefits, she did
not allow us to get into a real discussion of the
scientific merits.
JUDGE STEIN: But I'm asking about
when you got the documents on January 29, was
there anything that precluded you from writing
back to EPA about that?
MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: Well, we did
respond to the request for cancellation. I must
say on that day, it was not possible to digest

everything new that we had been given. I can assure you that the registrants spent most of the holidays trying to figure out what was going on and digesting what had been said in the meetings in December, and that everybody immediately gave high attention to reviewing EPA's documents.

But this is not something that was readily available, and really, it appears that EPA intended to obfuscate it. Why not explain right in the decision document? Why not explain in the risk assessment document? Why not explain somewhere that this is the selection and why?

And the reason is the EPA cannot justify in the face of its prior statements using an endpoint that is on water when what the concern is is sediment, and they specifically said that's a higher tier study that should have been done and that we would rely on, so the registrants did it.

JUDGE STEIN: Okay, so one thing that would be helpful for rebuttal is for me to understand the exact sequence, because as I've

read those decision documents, I see a reference 1 2 to two endpoints, not one. 3 MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: Okav. 4 JUDGE STEIN: What's the dialogue in 5 Bayer's view? 6 MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: In Bayer's view, a 7 measured scientific dialogue would be a chance to 8 explore the data which was done, and then what 9 conclusions should be drawn based on the data. 10 And because EPA never shared its conclusion 11 relying on one sole endpoint, there never was an 12 opportunity to have that discussion. You can't 13 have a discussion about something you don't know exists. 14 15 JUDGE LYNCH: And when you say 16 conclusion, conclusions about the data, or the 17 ultimate conclusion or determination? What are 18 you specifically referring? 19 MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: Yeah, so they do -20 they are different, but they do go hand in hand 21 in our program and interactions between the agency and the scientists because there generally 22

is a common understanding of how the information, 1 2 once the conclusions are reached, how those conclusions may affect the terms and conditions 3 of registration. 4 So they are very closely, very closely 5 intertwined, but the conclusion itself was not 6 7 something that was revealed to the registrants 8 until a chance to really parse through the 9 documents that were made available on January 29. JUDGE LYNCH: And just so I'm clear, 10 11 just articulate what's the conclusion? 12 MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: So there are a 13 couple of different elements to it, but the 14 element on the toxicity endpoint, if you were to 15 use the correct toxicity endpoint, you would have an unmistakable conclusion that none of the water 16 17 monitoring ever hit that endpoint. That was 18 actually also true for the lower endpoint. 19 There had never been any detections in the multi-million dollars worth of 20 any of groundwater monitoring data that exceeded that 21 22 But EPA then took that endpoint and

1 inserted it into a model to predict certain 2 conclusions about the future, and those are the 3 conclusions. And the other term I 4 JUDGE LYNCH: wanted clarification on is you referred to a new 5 б conclusion in the January memo. 7 MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: Yes. JUDGE LYNCH: Which - what are you 8 referring to there? 9 MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: Which would be that 10 11 using that old endpoint that had been superceded 12 by better data and putting it into a model would 13 predict that there would be an unreasonable 14 adverse effect on the environment, so it was 15 using that endpoint in conjunction with another 16 analysis. 17 JUDGE LYNCH: I wanted to go back for 18 a minute to the question about the challenge to 19 the legality of the condition. In your appeal 20 brief, you summarily dismiss the application of 21 Laches, but I'm not clear as to why. Why do you 22 think Laches, the Laches Doctrine can't be

applied?

MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: It does go back to the discussion we were having earlier about the fear dealing, the understanding of what would take place in the wake of the submission of data, and the registrants couldn't have agreed to something that they never could have predicted would happen.

They agreed that they would request cancellation if there was a scientific determination of unreasonable adverse effects on the environment after the measured dialogue on the data and the conclusions, but they never could have imagined that there would be so much effort put into - and millions of dollars put into generating the data that EPA requested in these meetings, and never be told what the actual final analysis was and have a discussion about it.

JUDGE WARD: Could I follow up on that? So if here, if in fact you have the opportunity to challenge whether there was or

wasn't a dialogue such that the condition was 1 2 triggered, then you've got the benefit of your 3 bargain. I mean, there's - there will be a - you 4 know, you had a hearing below. There will be a 5 decision by the board. You've had an opportunity to take that issue on in this proceeding. 6 7 If that's true, then really I think 8 point about the Laches is we didn't your 9 challenge it because we assumed we would have the 10 measured dialogue, and if that didn't happen, we 11 would have a chance to contest it. We are having that opportunity. 12 13 You want to go further and actually 14 challenge the legality of the condition itself, 15 not the condition - not whether or not there was 16 a measured dialogue, but whether they could have 17 included that kind of a condition at all, and I 18 think that's the question that we're wondering 19 why isn't that question barred by Laches? 20 JUDGE STEIN: You may go ahead and 21 answer. 22 MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: And I think they

are tied together in that the - it's hard to have envisioned how this would play out, and it is hard to explain what is so very wrong about it without an independent tribunal looking at the actual attributes of the compound and seeing what a work around this illegal provision was.

It's - without going back and having that 6(b) hearing, EPA will be emboldened to continue to issue press releases saying terrible things about products and never subjected its science to review, and it will use its power and authority over the applicants who have no power in that negotiating position, to insist upon conditions that are seeking to eliminate procedures that are - the registrants are entitled to by statute.

JUDGE STEIN: Thank you very much.

You'll have a chance to respond during rebuttal.

And when we set the time for EPA, can we add 15

minutes to their time, please? So I'm going to

start with the same question that I asked counsel

for Bayer and Nichino.

Since she didn't get to make 1 2 opening statement, neither will you. You can get 3 - you can weave it back in. But how is it that 4 the board has the authority to look at 5 lawfulness of the condition in this proceeding? MS. GOERKE: We would submit that what 6 7 the board has to look at was what was in our 8 notice of intent and what the ALJ has maintained 9 was appropriate under 6(e) which was were the 10 conditions of this registration met, and does our 11 determination for existing stocks comply with the 12 statute? 13 We would not maintain that whether the 14 condition was lawful was ever properly before the 15 ALJ or the board, that to challenge the - as we 16 have maintained in our brief, to challenge the 17 actual condition, they had that opportunity 18 multiple avenues which they clearly indicate they 19 do not consider a choice, but it is a statutorily 20 available option that they choose not to pursue.

ahead, Your Honor. I was just going to -

So the fact that the finding - oh, go

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1 JUDGE STEIN: Well, so you would submit that the ALJ went beyond the statutory 2 3 authority in determining whether the condition was lawful or not? 4 5 MS. GOERKE: Well, I think she was absolutely required to do so by the motion 6 7 because that was - you know, to say it was lawful 8 or not in terms of that that was exactly what 9 they were saying should be excluded. maintaining that that was fully resolved at that 10 11 time, but it was a lawful condition. 12 JUDGE STEIN: I think I'm now 13 confused. 14 MS. GOERKE: Okay. 15 JUDGE STEIN: I think what the board 16 struggling with is do we even have the 17 authority to look at the question in 2016 of whether or not the condition was lawful? That's 18 19 a separate question from whether the condition 20 was complied with. 21 MS. GOERKE: Okay. 22 JUDGE STEIN: The ALJ in her ruling

appears to have ruled that the condition was I'm asking whether that went beyond the authority that she had in this proceeding. MS. GOERKE: Oh, I'm sorry, then I misspoke. I was thrown by not giving my prepared remarks. I apologize, sorry. No, clearly when we made that - when she made that determination about the lawfulness of the condition, she looked at the emails that went back and forth between the registrant, and the registrant's regulatory counsel, and EPA counsel in terms understanding of the condition that was made at the time in 2008 when it was accepted.

And it was clearly an integral - that condition, the lawfulness of it, was an integral part, the testimony indicated, for the EPA to make the necessary finding that there would be no unreasonable adverse effects. So that condition itself she determined was not unlawful. not answering your question?

JUDGE WARD: So I think the challenge here is that there is - the question is framed a

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1 number of different ways. It's first framed by 2 the registrants as, you know, is this properly a 3 6(e) hearing? It really needs to be 6(b), and 4 then I think somewhat alternatively, although you could say it's the other side of the same coin, 5 the condition itself is unlawful. 6 And I think what the board is 7 grappling with is do we even need to address is 8 9 this properly - well, do we need to address the validity of the condition in determining first, 10 is it properly a 6(e) hearing? 11 12 And if we determine it's properly a 13 6(e) hearing because it's based on the agency's assertion that they're seeking to cancel this 14 conditional registration under 6(e) because a 15 16 condition has not been complied with, if it's in 17 that box, then the next step is what are the 18 What are the limits of that 6(e) contours? 19 hearing? And in that 6(e) hearing, can you 20 challenge the validity of the condition itself? 21 In the hearing? MS. GOERKE: 22 JUDGE WARD: In the hearing, and if

1 this is properly a 6(e) hearing. 2 MS. GOERKE: If it's properly a 6(e) 3 hearing, I would still get back to that no, 4 challenging the lawfulness is not proper in a 5 6(e) hearing, so. JUDGE WARD: But do we have to address 6 7 the lawfulness of the condition in determining 8 whether it's properly a 6(e) or a 6(b) hearing? 9 MS. GOERKE: No, I would say you do 10 not under the statute, no. 11 JUDGE STEIN: Thank you. 12 MS. GOERKE: Okay. 13 JUDGE WARD: So I wanted to follow up on another issue and that concerns the scope of 14 15 what a voluntary cancellation proceeding would 16 have looked like under 6(f). 17 MS. GOERKE: Okay. 18 JUDGE WARD: If I understand the 19 conditional registration, that was the path that 20 the registrants arguably negotiated for, that if 21 EPA made a particular finding, they had a week to 22 request voluntary cancellation under 6(f).

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MS. GOERKE: Yes.

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JUDGE WARD: And in a 6(f) process, how would that have played out, and maybe more specifically, what opportunity would the registrants have had to challenge the merits of your unreasonable adverse effects determination?

MS. GOERKE: Not - they wouldn't have had opportunity through a an voluntary cancellation. When a registrant submits a voluntary cancellation pursuant to 6(f), they this happens occasionally, and the registrants here have done that previously for another product, they submit their for request voluntarily cancellation.

The agency publishes that in the Federal Register. The agency can take comment for either 30 to 180 days depending on whether that's waived, and the agency ostensibly could take comments on that. I mean, that's the process allowed under 6(f).

JUDGE WARD: And could the registrants have commented, and in those comments challenge

1 your determination as the basis for basically 2 having initiated that voluntary cancellation 3 process? MS. GOERKE: I am not sure. I do not 4 5 know if they could have within that process. I 6 would think not, but I'm not familiar with that 7 actually. I just know as a process how that 8 works with 6(f) when they would -9 JUDGE STEIN: What would have 10 precluded them from commenting? 11 MS. GOERKE: I don't think anything 12 would have precluded them from commenting in that 13 It clearly would have given them, you 14 know, additional opportunities to raise certain 15 things. But I mean, back to, if I could get back to that particular condition when that was 16 17 negotiated as - you know, has been upheld 18 previously, the strict cancellation, you know, 19 provision where there is a draw dead for clarity. 20 I think initially this was viewed, 21 even though we're here at this time discussing 22 this eight years after the registration was

issued, you know, going back in terms of what the intent was, what we were able to garner from certain exhibits, we have the respondent exhibits that go through the emails.

I think the view was, you know, we initially wanted the cancellation date. The registrants didn't prefer the cancellation date. Then the view was we would prefer to have the agency's, you know, the dialogue, which this is also in the record, would prefer to have that voluntary cancellation package like an agreement that this will go away if later we find unreasonable adverse effects as we did here, that that would have already been in the agency's hands.

I, you know, present to you that this is how the negotiations back and forth between EPA and the program typically occurs, various measures, various conditions, these negotiations, and that did occur in this circumstance in 2008. And the circumstance now is that they wish they wouldn't have taken that provision, yet it was

there, and it was an integral part for the agency to make their unreasonable adverse effects finding in 2008 in order to grant this registration.

JUDGE WARD: But I want to go back to the 6(f) proceeding because in the briefs you filed before the ALJ, I think you described it as a process that would allow for both an opportunity for public comment, and an additional opportunity to influence EPA's decision making.

And I'm trying to understand what that opportunity to influence EPA's decision making, what was that? In your view, what does that entail? Does it include the registrants? Does it include members of the public who may want this pest - these pesticides to be on the market?

MS. GOERKE: I think it's open. It could be growers. It could be distributors. It could be, you know, environmental groups that have concerns about the product. It is open. That process is available for comment. How indeed that, you know, how that process evolves,

1	you know, I just know that they could have
2	commented.
3	JUDGE WARD: Would you have had to
4	respond to those comments on the merits?
5	MS. GOERKE: If -
6	JUDGE WARD: If they challenged your
7	unreasonable adverse effects determination in a
8	6(f) proceeding through their comments.
9	MS. GOERKE: I think we would say that
10	the unreasonable - on unreasonable adverse
11	effects, they could challenge it, but the actual
12	proceeding would need to be pursued under 6(b)
13	for unreasonable adverse effects, not the 6(f)
14	proceeding.
15	JUDGE WARD: So you wouldn't have to
16	respond to their comments on the merits?
17	MS. GOERKE: We could respond, but I
18	don't know if they'd have a right of action if we
19	didn't respond in a way that's, you know, they
20	felt satisfied about that.
21	JUDGE WARD: And so where I think that
22	leaves the agency is that there's no opportunity

for the company at this point in time to challenge your 2016 determination of unreasonable adverse effects, the one that you made that triggered this -

MS. GOERKE: But that was the choice they made when they accepted the condition. That's the bind that we're in at this moment. That was the choice they accepted when they took the conditional registration with those explicit conditions in it, that they were not going to get to challenge the unreasonable adverse effects if the next provision of that condition is they will accept it.

That is how the agency was able to go forward and issue the initial conditional registration. So for it to be now that challenging the unreasonable adverse effects determination, this was not initiated via a 6(b) process. These were the conditions that the agency and the program relied upon in order to issue this.

I think if you turn your attention to

the exhibits that go through the many uncertainties and the risks that the agency envisioned for this product to accumulate in the environment, that condition was essential.

And so to say could they have raised the unreasonable adverse effects within 6(f) and what would we have done, I would speculate that, as part of the conditions of their registration, was not something that we would have envisioned that they could have challenged. It is not written into the registration.

It is clearly that they will accept
that once we have had a discussion about all of
the data, which we have submitted. We have had a
discussion about all of the data which also
brings me to the issue that was raised about what
was in their notice of intent and what was in
their objections they initially filed. What you
were seeing -

JUDGE STEIN: Before we leave this topic and go to that however, I want to be sure that I understand what the opportunities were

back in 2008 for the company to challenge what the agency was proposing, and whether these were real opportunities or not as counsel for Bayer has argued.

So if I understand it - I'm not sure
I understand what the agency really is saying on
6(f) at this point, but I'd like to go to the
question of both a denial and a federal court
challenge and have the agency explain exactly
what they think were the company's options.

MS. GOERKE: Okay, the registrants had a number of options available to them in 2008 and thereafter. Among them, they could have proposed alternative mitigation measures for the cancellation on applications, or application rates, geographical areas of use.

They could have declined the registration and pursued a denial hearing. They could have submitted a subsequent application to acquire registrations without the cancellation condition, and if denied, pursued a hearing on whether they were entitled to registrations

without that condition.

Instead, they accepted the cancellation condition in this registration and pursued no other recourse. It is entirely a result of their own choices that registrants find themselves in the position where the only proceeding available to them now is under section 6(e), but that does not make this section 6(e) proceeding any less appropriate.

JUDGE STEIN: But how real were the options that you laid out, so, like taking them one by one? You're prepared to grant a conditional registration. There is a condition in there the company doesn't like.

(Simultaneous speaking)

JUDGE STEIN: They're saying they
don't like it now. Does the record reflect
whether there's even been a circumstance where a
company has voluntarily taken a denial in those
circumstances rather than taking a condition they
don't want?

MS. GOERKE: To my knowledge, they

1	haven't, but my understanding is that that is a
2	testament to the success of the program, and that
3	the registrants and the program work to ensure
4	that measures can be developed so that EPA can
5	make the finding, either in an unconditional
6	registration or in a conditional registration for
7	a limited period of time, that there are no
8	unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.
9	JUDGE STEIN: So if the company
10	accepted the conditional registration, could they
11	have filed in federal court seeking to excise the
12	- what was referred to in the correspondence as
13	the fast death -
14	MS. GOERKE: The cancellation
15	provision?
16	JUDGE STEIN: The cancellation.
17	MS. GOERKE: Yes.
18	JUDGE STEIN: Could they have done
19	that, and if so, how would the agency have viewed
20	that?
21	MS. GOERKE: So I just want to make
22	sure I understand. Is this when it's an

1	application or we have granted a registration -
2	JUDGE STEIN: You have granted a
3	conditional registration with this condition in
4	it. Could the companies have gone to court to
5	challenge the lawfulness of the condition at that
6	time?
7	MS. GOERKE: I don't know why they
8	couldn't have challenged that.
9	JUDGE WARD: Could I follow-up on the
10	one option of accepting a denial of the
11	registration? Then what would their options have
12	been if they had decided they didn't want to
13	accept the condition?
14	MS. GOERKE: If they did not want to
15	accept the condition and
16	JUDGE WARD: And then?
17	MS. GOERKE: And then they would not
18	have received a registration.
19	JUDGE WARD: They would have denied
20	the registration. And then what steps could they
21	have pursued?
22	MS. GOERKE: They would pursue a

statutorial if they wanted the denial hearing, or 1 2 they could have, as we indicated, they could have accepted the registration as it exists now and 3 submitted a new application with that condition 4 5 removed from it and have the Agency go through 6 the process to issue that registration similar to 7 a denial so they could have had their product on 8 the market. 9 JUDGE WARD: But if they had not 10 accepted the condition, they could have pursued a 11 denial hearing? 12 MS. GOERKE: If they didn't accept this condition? 13 14 JUDGE WARD: Correct. 15 They wouldn't have -- if MS. GOERKE: 16 they didn't accept the condition and the terms 17 were clear in the actual preliminary acceptance 18 letter that became a part of this registration, 19 if they didn't accept any of these terms and 20 conditions, their registration was considered 21 null and void. There is no registration if they 22 didn't want to --

1	JUDGE WARD: It would have been
2	denied.
3	MS. GOERKE: Yes.
4	JUDGE WARD: You had said they could
5	have a denial hearing.
6	MS. GOERKE: Yes.
7	JUDGE WARD: Under what provision of
8	the statute?
9	MS. GOERKE: For the denial hearing?
10	Give me one moment. Sorry. It is
11	JUDGE WARD: And the reason I'm asking
12	is I'm not quite clear on how the statutory
13	framework works here based on today's argument
14	because I think counsel for the registrants had
15	said if they hadn't accepted the condition, the
16	conditional registration, they wouldn't have had
17	an opportunity for a 6(b) hearing. They would
18	have, I presume, had to go to federal court. And
19	what I'm hearing, I'm hearing you say maybe
20	something different.
21	MS. GOERKE: It's 3(c)(6) is that
22	provision for the actual denial hearing in FIFRA.

1	JUDGE WARD: Okay.
2	MS. GOERKE: Okay.
3	JUDGE WARD: That's helpful. Thank
4	you.
5	MS. GOERKE: Okay.
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	JUDGE STEIN: So directing your
7	attention to another question, the statute in
8	6(d) refers, I believe, to substantial evidence
9	in talking about the hearing. Is this
10	preponderance of the evidence? Is there a
11	difference between substantial evidence on the
12	record and preponderance of the evidence?
13	MS. GOERKE: In 6(c)?
13 14	. 40 000 2000 - 16180 - 1710 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 00
	MS. GOERKE: In 6(c)?
14	MS. GOERKE: In 6(c)? JUDGE STEIN: It's in 6(d).
14 15	MS. GOERKE: In 6(c)? JUDGE STEIN: It's in 6(d). MS. GOERKE: In 6(d), the hearing for
14 15 16	MS. GOERKE: In 6(c)? JUDGE STEIN: It's in 6(d). MS. GOERKE: In 6(d), the hearing for 6(d).
14 15 16 17	MS. GOERKE: In 6(c)? JUDGE STEIN: It's in 6(d). MS. GOERKE: In 6(d), the hearing for 6(d). JUDGE STEIN: 6(d) states that a
14 15 16 17	MS. GOERKE: In 6(c)? JUDGE STEIN: It's in 6(d). MS. GOERKE: In 6(d), the hearing for 6(d). JUDGE STEIN: 6(d) states that a decision after a hearing shall be based on
14 15 16 17 18	MS. GOERKE: In 6(c)? JUDGE STEIN: It's in 6(d). MS. GOERKE: In 6(d), the hearing for 6(d). JUDGE STEIN: 6(d) states that a decision after a hearing shall be based on "substantial evidence of record." I'm interested

1	MS. GOERKE: I would submit that it
2	means preponderance, substantial evidence.
3	JUDGE STEIN: Are you saying they're
4	the same? Okay. Thank you. Could we have an
5	answer that the court reporter can hear?
6	MS. GOERKE: Oh, I'm sorry. I'm
7	sorry. No, I don't, I don't know the I don't
8	ter.
9	JUDGE STEIN: You don't know the
10	difference?
11	MS. GOERKE: I don't know the
12	difference.
13	JUDGE STEIN: Okay, thank you.
14	JUDGE WARD: Could you turn, to
15	address the dialogue question, the Agency's view
16	as to what dialogue occurred and
17	MS. GOERKE: Yes.
18	JUDGE WARD: how your view as to
19	how that satisfied the condition of the
20	registration?
21	MS. GOERKE: Right. As to the
22	argument that that wasn't triggered because it

was a sufficient scientific dialogue; is that correct? That is your question? We have addressed this thoroughly in our brief, and we do believe that this issue about substantial dialogue was not appropriately before the ALJ.

What was laid out in the objections by the registrants was issues about whether this was appropriately a 6(b) versus a 6(e) hearing. If it was appropriately laid out, the Agency would have placed in additional information, which we did not because it was not specifically raised that this was a condition precedent. But the information that meetings were held from the time and the record indicates from December 2014 when certain scientific studies that were required pursuant to the registration were submitted, that studies, there were many discussions throughout 2015 on the water monitoring report with the Agency. So there were discussions.

When they're talking about dialogue, as I'm understanding it, they're talking about the concerns about the endpoint that was raised,

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and we would submit that the discussions on the science throughout did occur with not only the scientists but the regulatory personnel. And, again, because this was not specifically raised until the actual hearing, we did not put forward information in the record that showed the extent of what information was shared when registrants' council mentioned before the holidays they became very well aware of this new information before the January 29th decision memo. So we would say that there was measured dialogue.

JUDGE WARD: But their argument is that the meeting in January, which I presume is after they received or learned that EPA had reverted to the lower endpoint and whatever material that was shared in advance of that meeting, that it wasn't really a dialogue, that EPA just came in and told them of their decision.

MS. GOERKE: Well, we listened to their perspective on how they disagree with the science conclusions. And back to the actual conditions of this registration, it did not

require scientific consensus, it did not require that they assent and agree to our science, and we believe that there was enough discussion so that, one, they understood where the Agency was coming from. There were those concerns about how we interpreted the various studies that were submitted throughout the end of 2014 and all the data up through then.

So we would submit that there was dialogue, and it wasn't required to be dialogue where they agree. This is a, this really comes down to a scientific disagreement, that that is not the heart of what the Agency's authority to issue a Notice of Intent to Cancel because the conditions of registration here were clearly not met. And that is why the Agency took this action that they did. We have not had opportunities previously to do SO because registrants typically, you know, we can work through the differences. Here that did not occur.

JUDGE STEIN: How do you respond to their argument that it wasn't until the January

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29th decision memorandum and a footnote in an 1 2 attachment that the company understood what toxic 3 endpoint the Agency was relying on? MS. GOERKE: 4 And I think that goes 5 back to the question I was just responding to, 6 it was clearly laid out in their 7 objections, we would have put forward the 8 information that was given to them in December, 9 which comports with they did not first learn of that in January buried in that document. But we 10 11 did not do so because that was not explicitly 12 laid out in their objections. 13 JUDGE STEIN: Okay. So assuming, 14 let's assume hypothetically that the Board is not 15 persuaded by the waiver argument, since you seem 16 to be hanging your hat here on the fact that the 17 objection was waived. If the Board decides to 18 reach the merits of the argument, can you give me 19 your best response to the company's argument? 20 About the chronic --MS. GOERKE: 21 JUDGE STEIN: The toxic endpoint that 22 they claim they didn't know about until January

1 29th. 2 MS. GOERKE: My response to that 3 the scientific argument was the change in endpoint or our determination on whether there 4 5 were unreasonable adverse effects was not 6 proper issue for the hearing because we pursued 7 action under FIFRA Section 6(e). JUDGE STEIN: No, I'm talking about --8 9 are you saying that the good faith dialogue is 10 not a proper issue for this hearing? 11 MS. GOERKE: No, that was not at issue 12 in the hearing whether there was good faith 13 scientific dialogue. That was not one of the issues that were raised in the --14 15 JUDGE STEIN: But I'm asking you --16 MS. GOERKE: Okay. 17 JUDGE STEIN: -- if the Board does not 18 agree that that issue was waived, then what's 19 The Agency doesn't have one? your answer? 20 MS. GOERKE: Well, no, I guess that 21 the answer would be we would have to, if required 22 do supplement the record and have so,

testimony, whether that would be the appropriate 1 2 to submit that information for the record. 3 JUDGE STEIN: But the Agency didn't 4 move to re-open the record; is that correct? MS. GOERKE: No, we didn't because we 5 6 supported the determination that was made by the 7 ALJ, that that was not properly, measured 8 scientific dialogue is a term of art that was put 9 forward by the registrants. That was not a term 10 and condition of their registration. 11 JUDGE WARD: But the registration 12 doesn't require dialogue. 13 MS. GOERKE: It said that we would discuss, there would be discussion about the 14 I can point you to that. That is 15 science. 16 Respondent Exhibit -- let's get right to what is 17 actually in the condition. JUDGE WARD: What I'm reading is the 18 19 condition at 6(b) or the paragraph 6(b) which EPA scientists 20 that the and their states 21 scientists shall engage in dialogue about the 22 data and the Agency's conclusions.

	MS. GOERKE: Yes. And we did have
dialog	gue about the data that was submitted by the
regist	rants and the conclusions that the Agency
came t	to regarding that data. So the chronic
toxici	ty endpoint that seems to be the issue that
the re	egistrants are making before you, I mean,
the Ag	ency generally relies on the most sensitive
endpoi	nt. But the fact of having discussions
about	the data, we did have discussions about the
data t	hat were submitted by the registrants. The
regist	rants don't agree with our conclusions.
	JUDGE WARD: In your view, does the
phrase	"conclusions" include the choice which
endpoi	nt to choose?
	MS. GOERKE: Absolutely not. No, that
is not	
	JUDGE WARD: And so you didn't need to
have a	dialogue about that choice or conclusion?
	MS. GOERKE: About the endpoint.
	JUDGE WARD: That's your position?
	MS. GOERKE: That that was not
requir	ed pursuant to the conditions, the terms

and conditions here, yes, that is correct. 1 2 JUDGE STEIN: So what does it mean to 3 have a dialogue about the data? What does that 4 encompass? 5 MS. GOERKE: That would encompass the 6 staff that did the assessments on the data, the scientific staff to discuss the results of how we 7 8 came to our conclusions on such scientific data 9 with the registrants, which I submit did occur 10 here, back to this was a disagreement about the 11 science. So whether --12 JUDGE STEIN: Would it not include a 13 discussion about the endpoints? 14 It could include a MS. GOERKE: 15 discussion about the endpoints if that did arise, 16 but, at the end of the day, if the registrants 17 disagree with the endpoint discussion, it was still incumbent on the Agency to be able to make 18 19 their no unreasonable --20 JUDGE STEIN: I understand the difference between the two. 21 I'm really just 22 trying to focus on what was within the scope of

this question of dialogue about the data, and I thought you had said that the toxic endpoint was not within the scope of that discussion. I don't think the court reporter can interpret what you're saying.

MS. GOERKE: I mean, if that has come up in a meeting before, then they could have discussed the endpoint. I'm saying it is not required pursuant to the conditions of the registration. That, to me, does not include the view of what is in the data that was generated by the registrants. The endpoint is how the Agency can get to make their actual scientific findings on whether there is unreasonable risk.

JUDGE WARD: If we didn't agree with you on that point, what does the record show in terms of the dialogue about the endpoint? The conclusion or the choice that EPA ultimately made?

MS. GOERKE: I don't think there is a record that gets into the thoroughness of the discussion on the endpoints because that was not

what we presented evidence on because that was 1 2 not in the objections. 3 JUDGE WARD: Okay. Could I follow-up 4 on a question about the existing stocks, which we 5 didn't have a chance to ask the registrants about 6 but --7 MS. GOERKE: Sure. 8 JUDGE WARD: -- I'm sure we'll have an 9 opportunity on rebuttal. But I think you had, in 10 your brief to the Board, you are acknowledging 11 that your inclusion of the retailers isn't 12 covered by the express terms of the policy as it 13 relates to a condition, a conditional 14 registration being canceled because a specific 15 condition hasn't been satisfied. How is 16 including them then nevertheless consistent with 17 the statute? 18 MS. GOERKE: Excuse me. How including 19 them --20 JUDGE WARD: Retailers, as opposed --21 MS. GOERKE: Oh, because, typically, 22 the Agency makes, it has to be clear on whether

it covered distributors and others who have product in their possession. Since they may not sell an unregistered pesticide, we have to specifically address what can happen in that circumstance when it is in the possession of retailers. So once a cancellation becomes effective, what happens to that product? That is why we addressed it.

JUDGE WARD: Well, I guess I'm asking you why is your decision to preclude the use of the existing stocks when they handed the retailers that decision consistent with the statute?

MS. GOERKE: I think the decision that was made, you know, as we've indicated, the reasoning was not just that the registrants shouldn't benefit, but the registrants would continue to benefit by virtue of the trade that was allowed to continue since it was in the hand in the distributors. So it was to be all-inclusive, so it was going to get back to the fact that the registrant did not comply with the

terms and the conditions, and the program made that determination not specifically to target distributors but because the registrants would still be benefitting from the distributors, you know, selling the product and making the profit for the registrants.

JUDGE WARD: Okay.

JUDGE STEIN: Bayer argues that there were new conclusions in the January 29th, 2016 Does the Agency agree with that, and, if so, why and, if not, why not?

MS. GOERKE: New conclusions on --JUDGE STEIN: In the January 29th, 2016 memo. That's the way I understand their argument.

MS. GOERKE: There may have been further and refined information from the time we met with them in early January, but understanding is that the information that ultimately became part of that decision was shared with the registrants before the holidays, mid to late December, in 2015. So there was not

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complete new information. That was a surprise to 1 2 the registrants, but, once again, we did not have 3 that information before the ALJ because that was 4 not properly raised in their --JUDGE STEIN: So what happened after 5 6 the January 6th meeting? Didn't Bayer submit information? 7 8 MS. GOERKE: Bayer submitted 9 additional studies that the Agency quickly turned around and reviewed to see if additional 10 11 mitigation would potentially allow certain label 12 uses for this product to continue. JUDGE STEIN: What does it mean for a 13 14 registration to be time limited, and what is the 15 difference between a time-limited registration 16 and a conditional registration with a fixed 17 expiration date? Well, I don't think 18 MS. GOERKE: 19 there's much of a distinction. Time limited, in this circumstance, was made more difficult, to 20 21 some extent, because of the voluntary 22 cancellation provision. It initially was for a

five-year period. And time limited could be however the Agency and the registrant determined what is the time necessary to have additional studies be developed, if it's two years, three years.

so the five-year period that was established when this registration was issued was subject to additional time frames that required the Agency to take certain action at a time after the five years. So I would speculate or submit to you that there is not much of a difference between a time limited and -- well, the expiration date, at the time the expiration date just sort of expires. The time limited, they continue to submit, and they did, and we approved extensions of those dates to allow for further studies to be submitted. And, again, I would submit the further discussion regarding the results of those studies.

JUDGE WARD: I want to go back to the question of the retailers or the distributors.

Is there anything in the record showing that EPA

looked at whether the retailers were, that somehow the registrants were profiting or would profit, I guess, following the Notice of Cancellation from continuing to be allowed to sell to the retailers? And once they buy them, then they resell them? I mean, I'm just trying to figure out what did EPA look at and what time frame was EPA considering in including retailers within the prohibition on the use of existing stocks?

MS. At the time GOERKE: determination was made, within the same month as EPA received registrants, that they refused to with the conditions, EPA determination and published the Notice of Intent to Cancel that included distributors because we were really taking a very strong position that failure to comply with conditions would not allow the Agency to continue to issue registrations with such terms and conditions that would be able to make the reasonable adverse effects findings. that distributors were just part of our

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rationale because, just based on the understanding that they would continue to profit, our provision was that they could return product back to the registrant so speculating that they would be able to make profits on that.

JUDGE WARD: Is that in the record in terms of an explicit finding by the Agency?

MS. GOERKE: No. The Agency's finding exclusively under the note existing stocks was based on the fact that it was a policy choice, basically, that we were just going to go forward under FIFRA, that it is not consistent with FIFRA to allow registrants to benefit financially from not complying with the terms and conditions of their registration by declining to submit the voluntary cancellation.

JUDGE WARD: So I guess I can understand how that might apply to what the registrants would sell following the issuance of the Notice of Cancellation, but what about the product in the hands, to the extent there is any, product in the hands of the retailers so it was

1 purchased prior to the issuance of the Notice of 2 Cancellation? 3 GOERKE: You mean the actual cancellation of our Notice of Intent --4 5 JUDGE WARD: Of your Notice of Intent to Cancel. 6 7 MS. GOERKE: Nothing. Everyone can -the Notice of Intent to Cancel is what we intend 8 9 to do. Nothing becomes effective with 10 distributors or anyone until the cancellation is effectuated. Once -- is that 11 12 what you're --13 No, I understand that. JUDGE WARD: 14 So let's assume sometime in July or August the 15 cancellation goes into effect, so does the, I 16 guess, ban on existing use by the product in the 17 hands of the retailers, correct? Yes. 18 MS. GOERKE: 19 JUDGE WARD: But it doesn't, Okay. 20 that applies both to the product in their hands 21 as of the date of the cancellation, as well as 22 anything that they bought before you issued the

Notice of Intent to Cancel, correct? For the 1 retailers. 2 3 MS. GOERKE: No, not before the Notice of Intent to Cancel. It's the cancellation date. 4 5 JUDGE WARD: Okay. So it's what --6 MS. GOERKE: Yes. of as the 7 cancellation date, all of that goes, I mean --8 yes. 9 JUDGE WARD: If I'm a distributor and 10 I bought product in December of 2015, and I 11 haven't sold it, just hypothetically yet 12 speaking, and then the cancellation becomes 13 effective in 2016, I can't then sell the product 14 I bought in 2015; is that correct? If it's still 15 in my hands. 16 MS. GOERKE: That is correct, yes. 17 JUDGE STEIN: I have a couple of 18 additional questions. Are there any limits on 19 the Agency's discretion to put conditions into a 20 registration, a conditional registration or a 21 registration? I'm not asking you what those

limits might be. I'm asking you whether there

are limits to EPA's discretion.

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MS. GOERKE: Yes, there would be limits. It has to be worked through an agreement with the registrant, depending on the actual product at hand. There would be --

JUDGE STEIN: I'm not asking about an agreement. I'm asking whether, under the statute and under EPA's authority, there are any limitations to the kind of conditions or any limitations that would somehow restrict EPA from putting into a registration something that is unlawful or beyond the scope, or is that --

MS. GOERKE: Well, the statute simply says other conditions as the administrator may prescribe. would envision that Ι those conditions would have to be germane to the actual It couldn't be something completely -product. I guess I'm not understanding. Of course, it couldn't be unlimited. It would have to be something that is based on what the administrator would deem would be something necessary for this particular product and mitigation measure. So I

1 wouldn't say it's completely unlimited, but it's 2 certainly is not exclusively limited. 3 JUDGE STEIN: There's a lot of cases 4 that speaks to whether or not a private party can 5 assert Laches against the government. Is there 6 anything that restricts the government 7 asserting a claim of Laches against a private 8 party? 9 MS. GOERKE: Not that I'm aware of, 10 no. 11 Could you walk through JUDGE WARD: 12 your Laches argument? I think you addressed it 13 in a footnote in your brief to the Board, but I'd 14 like to have you speak to what you think is the 15 strongest case for Laches, as well as do you have 16 any other case support then -- I hope I'm reading 17 this right -- a 1919 Supreme Court case? 18 MS. GOERKE: Yes. 19 JUDGE WARD: Going to Judge Stein's 20 question about the ability of the government to 21 assert Laches against a private party. 22 I'm sorry. Beyond this MS. GOERKE:

particular case, there is nothing that we -- do you want me to walk you through the argument? Is that what you --

JUDGE WARD: I just wanted you to briefly walk me through your best facts for Laches here.

MS. GOERKE: Okay. As we indicated right here, since registrants did not initiate, as we have maintained, a timely challenge to the condition, this registration was issued in 2008, it is not clear from the statute of limitations that there is a challenge allowed to the legality of any part of the registrations six years after the actual registration was issued. Their lack of timeliness raises the issue of that EPA did not make a finding to issue this conditional registration without this condition. The condition at issue here, the voluntary cancellation condition, was an essential part of making the unreasonable adverse effects finding because the Agency wanted to ensure that they have this product removed from the

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marketplace quickly if, indeed, we later determined after the time limit and conditional registration ended that the product did cause unreasonable adverse effects.

And EPA, also we maintain that the remedy, if the EPA were to find that this condition was illegal, would be to invalidate the registrations as null and void since this condition was an integral part of issuing the registration back to, we wanted to ensure that this product could be removed if we later determined it no longer met the standard of no reasonable adverse effects on the environment.

And, of course, as we indicate here, the factual issues of what was the thinking at the time this was issued are difficult to discern because the individuals who made the determination are no longer at the Agency, senior management and some of the senior personnel, I understand, at Bayer.

So what we had to rely upon in terms of the understanding that the registrants

knowingly, willingly participated 1 in this 2 condition was that they have waived their ability 3 almost eight years later to say that this condition was unlawful since the Agency maintains 4 that this condition was essential to issuing the 5 6 registration to begin with. 7 JUDGE WARD: And are you aware of any 8 more recent case law that addresses the question 9 of the government asserting Laches against a 10 private party? MS. GOERKE: I am not. 11 12 JUDGE WARD: Okay. 13 JUDGE STEIN: I don't think the Board 14 has further questions. If you, you know, want to 15 use your three minutes remaining time, you may, 16 or it's up to you. 17 MS. GOERKE: Yes, I think I would prefer to use my remaining time to go back to 18 19 of the things that I was hoping to 20 specifically address. Just a second. I would like to address the cases that 21 22 were referenced by counsel, Reckitt Benkiser and

Woodstream. With regards to Reckitt Benkiser, those decisions did not involve any failure to comply with conditions of registration and did not address Section 6(e) proceedings, and the registrants here are trying to stretch the Reckitt court beyond their context.

Some of the Reckitt registrations were Section 3(c)(7) conditional registrations, but there was no indication that the registrant failed to comply with any condition. The Reckitt registration certainly did not include cancellation conditions, unlike Woodstream where two district court judges each held that EPA has authority to impose a wide range of conditions, especially including conditions that canceled those conditional registrations without any further process. The conditions at issue in the instant case provided registrants with much more process than the automatic cancellations in Woodstream.

In summation, the ALJ correctly decided in her corrected initial decision that

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the voluntary cancellation provision was a lawful condition of the registrations and registrants did not initiate and pursue appropriate action to comply with that condition, making these registrations properly subject to cancellation under Section 6(e). The ALJ also correctly decided that EPA's determination with respect to the disposition of existing stocks was consistent with FIFRA.

EPA respectfully requests that the Board uphold the orders issued in the Motion for Accelerated Decision, Motion to Limit the Scope of Testimony, and the ALJ's corrected initial decision, and order the cancellation of registrants' flubendiamide products, subject to the existing stocks provision in the Notice of Intent to Cancel. Thank you.

JUDGE STEIN: Thank you very much. I appreciate your views, and now we'll turn it back to counsel for petitioner for five minutes of rebuttal. And I think, since we have one of the

JUDGE WARD: Counsel for Amici.

JUDGE STEIN: If counsel for Amici would like to say a few words after the rebuttal, I think we will provide that opportunity. But having given you five minutes, I'm going to start with a question. And my question relates to substantial evidence. What does it mean that Section 6(d) states that the decision after hearing should be based on substantial evidence of record? Does that mean preponderance of the evidence, or does Bayer claim it means something different?

MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: Our understanding of the standards is that they are a little bit different and that substantial evidence is more akin to looking at an arbitrary and capricious standard than the preponderance of the evidence. It's a fine line that we've often struggled to parse in the case law, but that's our understanding.

JUDGE STEIN: Has the Supreme Court spoken to this question at all?

1	MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: In the context of
2	any type of administrative proceeding?
3	JUDGE STEIN: Yes.
4	MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: That's a good
5	question. I know there is court of appeals case
6	law, quite a bit, including in our area. And we
7	can get those citations to you.
8	JUDGE STEIN: Okay.
9	MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: I don't recall a
10	Supreme Court case on the issue, but there may be
11	one also.
12	JUDGE STEIN: Okay. And I note that
13	Bayer has not briefed the burden of proof
14	question. Do you disagree that Bayer and Nichino
15	bear the burden of proof in this proceeding?
16	MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: We do not. We
17	agree.
18	JUDGE STEIN: You agree. Thank you.
19	JUDGE WARD: I'd like to follow-up, if
20	I could, just to ask you to address the existing
21	stocks question and the question of the retailers
22	and the distributors.

SZMUSZKOVICZ: Yes. 1 MS. So our 2 understanding is of the Notice of Intent to 3 Cancel is that, if it becomes a final notice of 4 the Agency by ruling of this Board, that, as of that date, no further sale or distribution may be 5 6 made by registrants, distributors, or retailers. And distribution includes, in our understanding 7 8 of the statute and the regulations, any movement 9 of the product, which is why our understanding is 10 that EPA took pains in the notice to say that such material could be distributed for disposal 11 12 or export but couldn't otherwise be distributed. 13 So if a retailer had material that had, our understanding is if a retailer had 14 15 material that had been purchased prior to the 16 effective date of the Notice of Cancellation, 17 that it could only distribute it back to the registrant for disposal or for export, but it 18 19 couldn't further distribute it to someone, a 20 third party. And that's our understanding. 21 JUDGE WARD: I want to follow-up, as 22 well, how I am reading or how I read your brief

on the existing stocks question and the statutory 1 2 determination, which is I'm reading 6(e)(1), it 3 requires the administrator to make a finding both that the sale or use is not inconsistent with the 4 5 of the act and will not purposes 6 unreasonable adverse effects on the environment. 7 But I was reading your brief to suggest that, in 8 making that determination or when the Agency makes that determination, it has to make both 9 10 So here, even though it found the first prong wasn't satisfied, it nevertheless 11 12 needed to proceed to prong two, which I'm not 13 sure how you can -- to me, you can't allow the 14 continued use unless you make both findings, you 15 make both findings. And having failed or having 16 found that the continued use wouldn't be 17 consistent with the statute, why would you need to make the second, reach the second prong of the 18

MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: You would need -this is the moment at which in a 6(e) hearing it
becomes such, it punctuates why we are in the

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wrong place at the wrong time because EPA made an unreasonable adverse effects on the environment finding. It is trying to preclude anyone from reviewing that. In their own policy on existing stocks, the Agency has said when it makes a finding based on unreasonable adverse effects on the environment, it will look case by case at the facts to determine what would be proper during that period, final period of use or sale of the product.

So it's a good example of how all the issues are being completed in this proceeding. It's why we thought that the registrant should be allowed, at a minimum, to present risk and benefit information because, during that period, EPA has to demonstrate that during that period of the sale of existing stocks there would be unreasonable adverse effects on the environment, not the broader question of over the whole life of the use of the product would there be unreasonable effects but during that short period. And EPA didn't examine any of that and

said that it just refused to do that, that this was a punitive action and they were not going to evaluate what the real impact of using the stocks would be.

EPA didn't take into account, and this came out at the hearing, that Nichino's product is unique to the United States. It's going to be disposed of in the environment. Could that possibly withstand scrutiny? It's an example, let alone the impact on those people who are expecting to be able to use the product should have been taken into account.

JUDGE WARD: So I think I understand your broader set of arguments and your arguments about the policy and how to interpret the policy.

I'm focused, though, specifically on the statutory language, which states EPA can allow the continued use or sale if it makes findings both, it has to find both A and B. If it can't find A, why does it even need to reach B, as a matter of statutory construction? I think that's my question.

1 MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: Because the concept 2 of risks and benefits and unreasonable adverse 3 effects is in virtually every decision that the 4 Agency makes. It's not a one-time thing. This 5 is a program that looks at every aspect of how a 6 product is made, distributed, sold, and used. 7 And it's completely consistent with the statute 8 that EPA would look at the question of, okay, 9 even if a condition wasn't met, is this period of 10 time, whatever the provision is that EPA has 11 allowed, and often it's years of time, to allow 12 existing stocks to clear the channel of trade 13 going to exceed the unreasonable adverse effects 14 standard? They are two really distinct, two 15 really distinct things. 16 JUDGE WARD: I understood 17 argument. Thank you. 18 MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: Yes, thank you. 19 Your Honor, in the interest of efficiency, I had 20 a couple of rebuttal points, but you had asked 21 for some specific citations. We want to be sure 22 to provide those, so should we go ahead and do

that first and get that --

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JUDGE STEIN: I will be providing an opportunity for that afterwards, so you don't need to give me the citations right here.

MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: All right, thank you. We appreciate that opportunity. We have few points in rebuttal, with your iust EPA expressed to the Court during indulgence. oral argument that it viewed the voluntary cancellation provisions of the letter essential. That was the word that was used. And this is a particularly poignant point for the EAB that we hope you will emphasize. Throughout our briefing, we have pointed out that EPA has the authority under statute under Section 6(c) to immediately suspend the use of a product, and there are specific standards for doing so. had the ability to do so if it felt at any point that it was required. Instead, it gave a five-year period to generate data. It extended that period time and time again based on review of data that had been submitted.

Whatever you think of EPA's new position about the need to immediately remove this product from the marketplace based on its past behavior, one thing is sure: it had the authority to do it, and this provision was not essential.

On the Laches point, there are a few perspectives that we wanted to share from the registrants' perspective. The registrants, in thinking about this, would have had no practical reason to go to court to challenge a condition that they had no reason to believe would be exercised to implement an unscientific unsound cancellation determination. If registrants had taken the registration with the condition and immediately sued in court, EPA would have said no final Agency action, we've asked you to submit the data, we said we're going to review it, we'll make a decision at the end of that process.

JUDGE STEIN: Let me make sure I understand what you're saying. Upon receipt of a

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conditional registration, why isn't that registration final Agency action to issue a conditional registration?

MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: So in other words, on the legality of that point, the condition, there was no reason to believe that EPA was going to implement it in an illegal, unlawful way.

JUDGE STEIN: Right. But when a company takes a permit, you can appeal certain conditions of the permit. We get appeals all the time from people who like most of the provisions of their permit but not others. We hear those. The terms of the permit get settled, and that can't be re-looked at in the context of an individual permit enforcement proceeding.

So I understand that a conditional registration is a little different or a registration is a little different. But I'm trying to understand why it is that FIFRA is so different that you can essentially take the benefits of a conditional registration for all these years and then come in later and say, oh,

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by the way, I really didn't like that after all.

And so from a point of view of certainty and finality, it at least occurs to us it's a bit unusual for someone to say they can reopen something years after the fact. And so I guess I don't understand why the conditional registration wasn't a final Agency action that you could have challenged, unless I've misunderstood your point.

MS. SZMUSZKOVICZ: And I think we're thinking about it from the standpoint of the practicalities also of going to court. The companies and the companies and the Agency had just concluded these negotiations. To turn around and file a lawsuit against the Agency over something that you didn't have any reason to believe would end up being an issue doesn't seem like the type of either successful type of It's certainly not something anybody endeavor. has ever tried before, and it does seem like it would be an unnecessary imposition on the courts over an issue that may never, never come to bear.

All the aspects of it seem to us that it would not have been an appropriate thing to do.

And the other suggestions about options, sure, file a new application. The fees for a new application at the time were \$500,000. Today, it's \$675,000. And to suggest that you would ask EPA to amend something right away after you've agreed, and, again, this is the agency that is regulating our everyday life on all of our products, I don't think it's realistic to suggest that anyone would do that.

The whole discussion about what's a dialogue in discussion I think can be pierced very easily because you can't have a discussion about something that you don't know is an issue. We did not know, and counsel for EPA admitted there's nothing in the record to suggest otherwise, that EPA was going to rely on a sole endpoint, and that endpoint was not the sediment endpoint, which is on the issue of concern, but the water endpoint. And as the questions from the panel have indicated, it's even difficult,

knowing that that's the issue, to figure that out in the record.

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There is a difference between time limited and expiration dates. And that's why there was a negotiation over that. An expiration date is considered something automatic. There has never been a lawsuit over whether that's legal, and a question was asked earlier about that. We submit that it would not be legal if EPA attempted to enforce an automatic expiration precisely because of the provisions of Section 6(b).

I'll quickly close. This case is another example of the Office of Pesticide Programs seeking to evade its statutory obligations under FIFRA Section 6(b). Even EPA has termed this provision that we have been discussing unconventional.

It's also a case in which the Office is seeking to elevate a political objective over science. The circumstances are so stark that the registrants have found it necessary to undertake

the unusual step of requesting review. Neither registrant has ever undertaken anything like this before. And as you know, it's the very first Section 6(e) proceeding. It's extraordinary, and it's especially so considering that this involves challenging the very agency that holds so much power over the registrants' livelihood. This point was driven home by the Office of General Counsel's pointed questioning of the president of one of the registrants during the hearing.

We thank you for your work already, your attention today, and your good questions, the work that we understand lies ahead. This is a matter that calls out for the Environmental Appeals Board to take a fresh look at the law and the facts, and we thank you for doing so.

JUDGE STEIN: Thank you, counsel. I
think I want to proceed as follows: I would like
to give Amici a brief opportunity if she wanted
to make any further statement. It's not
essential. So if you would like to, you may.
And if not, then I will talk about next steps.

Absolutely.

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MR. LEHRENBAUM: Thank you, your Honor. I am Warren Lehrenbaum --

JUDGE STEIN: I'm sorry. I can't hear you.

MR. LEHRENBAUM: I'm sorry. Warren Lehrenbaum, an attorney at Crowell Moring representing Amici CropLife America, and I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you just briefly to reiterate, I think, the main point of the brief that we offered below, which was that we believe that it's clear from both the statute and the legislative history that Section 6(b) is the appropriate section upon which EPA can proceed if it determines that a product needs to be, a registration needs to be canceled because of unreasonable adverse effects and that it was unlawful to try to essentially bypass that statutory mechanism by including this particular condition of registration in the registration at issue here and, in effect, by including that condition of registration and acting in a manner

that we feel was unlawful, that that unlawful provision could not be rendered lawful by virtue of the registrants' acceptance of that condition. The condition is unlawful as it is, regardless of whether the registrant accepted it or not.

JUDGE STEIN: Okay.

MR. LEHRENBAUM: Thank you.

JUDGE STEIN: Thank you very much. If
I can have a minute to concur with my panel
members. Thank you very much for indulging us.
I think we would like to proceed as follows: This
is a very important case and it is a very
complicated case, and we also know the priority
everyone attaches to a prompt decision. The
Board would like to have post-argument briefs
from the parties, and we envision issuing an
order by no later than Friday of this week. And
in that order, we will set some parameters for
the length of the briefs.

We may identify particular issues that
we would like the parties to brief. I'm not
guaranteeing that, but I think we'll take a look

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at and review what's happened here today and see if we have any outstanding questions.

We would like those briefs submitted by July 1st at noon. We'll give you a week for those briefs. And we will, at that point we will consider the record to be complete and closed and we will proceed to try to make an expeditious decision.

The Board envisions issuing a decision by the end of July. We recognize that you might prefer a prompter decision than that, but, at this point, in light of the extensive briefing and the request for oral argument and the issues that we have discussed today, we would envision taking the briefs on July 1st and proceeding to render our final decision. It may be before the end of July, but we envision it would be no later than the end of July. If anyone has any concerns about that, they can point that out in their briefs. But this is a very expedited proceeding and, at the same time, we want to be able to do justice to the issues that have been presented to

us on all sides. 1 2 I also would like to thank the many 3 visitors who have come a long way to be able to 4 participate in this argument, and we appreciate 5 everyone's efforts to meet these expedited 6 deadlines. And we will continue to do our part, 7 as well. Thank you very much. The argument is 8 9 now adjourned. MS. DUNCAN: All rise. 10 11 (Whereupon, the above-referred to 12 matter went off the record at 2:54 p.m.) 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

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Before: US EPA/EAB

Date: 06-22-16

Place: Washington, DC

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